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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
OGDEN CITY, A ~Iunicipal Corporation, 
Plain.tiff, 
vs. 
FERRELL H ADAMS, State ~1_1reasurer of Utah, 
Defendant. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
~ ~UL THATCHER, 
F I L ~ .IJlRARLES H. SNEDDON, • ' A. ~f') JACK A. RICHARDS, 
J \J L 1 <± 19-.;..... Attorneys for Plaintiff 
----------------------;:~-:::--{-~;~;.;·-·· 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
OGDEX CITY, A ~lunicipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FERRELL H. ADA~IS, State Treasurer of Utah, 
Defendant. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Comes now the Plaintiff and respectfully shows and 
represents to the Honorable Court: 
The majority opinion is erroneous in not construing 
Section 46-0-219, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, to make 
it operative and effective rather than making a. sub-
stantial part of it nugatory and its enactment by the 
legislature an absurdity. 
For the foregoing reason, plaintiff respectfully 
petitions this Court to reconsider the case and grant 
a rehearing thereof, and upon said rehearing, to grant 
the relief prayed for in the complaint filed herein. 
Dated this 12th day of July, 1952. 
PAUL THATCHER, 
CHARLES H. SNEDDON, 
JACK A. RICHARDS, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are adequately stated in the plaintiff's 
brief heretofore filed. Reference is made to the opinion 
filed herein, particularly the second to last paragraph 
of the majority opinion, which reads: 
''Thus we conclude that the Legislature intended 
to remit fines and forfeitures to towns and 
cities only when the attorneys of such municipal-
ities conduct on behalf of the State the proceed-
ings against the accused, but the Legislature has 
failed to give town and city attorneys that 
authorization and hence Sec. 46-0-219, insofar 
as it provides for the remission of fines and for-
feitures to towns and cities, is ineffectual until 
such time as that authorization is conferred." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. The majority opinion is erroneous in not con-
struing Section 46-0-219, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, to make it operative and effective rather 
than making a substantial part of it nugatory 
and its enactment by the legislature an absurdity. 
ARGUMENT 
The Court's opinion makes ineffective Section 46-
0-219, U tab Code Annotated, 1943, except as to that 
phrase which requires all fines and forfeitures to he 
paid to the state treasurer. In effect, it holds that the 
legislature did a useless and meaningless thing in pro-
viding that certain fines a-rid forfeitures be remitted to 
towns, cities and counties. 
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One of the cardinal rnlP~ of ~tatntory construction 
is that statutes should be construed, if possible, so that 
they are effertiYe rather than nugatory. See numerous 
cases digested, ~=a lT tah & Pacific Digest 819, "Statute", 
Sections 17-1 and 175. The editor's comments there, 
citing many cases, are : 
··A statute must be construed, if possible, so as 
to give it force and effect.'' 
''Courts will construe the language of a statute 
so as to give effect to, rather than to nullify, it.'' 
"If language will reasonably permit, statutes will 
be construed so as to render them operative.'' 
In Tr alters rs. BaJ/k of .America Nt. Trust (1937), 
9 Cal. (2) 46,52; 69 P. (2) 839, 110 .A.L.R. 1259; Sacra-
mento CouHty rs. Sacramento City, 75 Cal . .App. (2) 436, 
171 P. (2) -177, the court holds: 
''A statute should never be construed so strictly 
as to render it absurd or nugatory.'' 
This Court in Taft vs. Grande, et al, 114 Utah 435, 
201 P. (2) 285, held, as reported in Headnote No. 1: 
• 'It is court's duty in interpreting a statute to 
give effect to legislative intent as expressed by 
wording of statute and if reasonably possible, 
effect should be given to every part of statute 
and if enactment is subject to one or more in-
terpretations by reason of conflicting provisions, 
then that construction which will harmonize and 
give effect to all provisions is preferred.'' 
And the Supreme Court of Arizona in Maricopa 
County vs. Doughal, 208 P. (2nd) 646, 69 .Ariz. 35, said: 
''The court should make every effort to sus-
tain and uphold statutes rather than to defeat 
them, and to give them operation and effect if 
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the language will permit, rather than treat them 
as meaningless.'' Utah and Pacific Digest, Stat-
utes Key Number 174 to 190, inclusive. 
Another important rule is that the intent of the 
legislature is the controlling factor and the Court should 
interpret the statute so that the intent of the legislature 
is given effect even though technical meanings of words 
have to be ignored. As this Court said in Board of 
Education vs. Bryner et al, 57 U. 78, 192 P. 627, at Page 
82 of the U tab report: 
"The doctrine is, however, also recognized that 
the same words, especially if found in different 
statutes, may not always have the same effect. 
It follows that in order to determine the intention 
and purpose of the lawmaker, and to harmonize 
conflicting provisions where such occur, it at 
times becomes necessary for the courts to expand 
or to restrict the ordinary and usual meaning of 
words, phrases, or clauses found in a particular 
section or statute. In that connection, it is also 
necessary to observe the cardinal rule of con-
struction that every word and phrase must be 
given some force and effect, if possible, and this 
notwith~.tanding the fact that in doing so the 
effect of the particular section or statute may 
thereby be enlarged or restricted, as the case 
may be. When, therefore, the language of a 
section or statute is ambiguous and doubtful, and 
on reading the language there is doubt whether 
it should be applied in accordance with its ordi-
nary and usual meaning or whether it should re-
ceive an enlarged or restricted construction and 
effect, it is the duty of the court to look beyond 
the statute if by doing so they can better de-
termine the intention and purpose of the law-
makers ... '' 
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and in Jloormt>ister cs. Dt>pt of Re9istratioH, 288 P. 900, 
76 Utah 146, headnote 3: 
· '\Y ord~ of statute are frequently given enlarged, 
restricted, or modified meaning to effectuate 
legislatiYe intent." 
In Trrathall v. Johnsou et al, 86 Ut. 50, 40 P. (2nd) 
755, the court said, at Page 103, Utah Report: 
· · I\::eeping in mind at least two rules of statutory 
construction, first, if possible, every word and 
phrase of a sta.tute must be given effect, and no 
words shall be rejected if possible to retain them 
and giYe them effect and meaning; and, second, 
the intent of the legislature must be ascertained 
and given effect, which intent and meaning is 
to be determined primarily from the language 
of the statutes themselves, recognizing that in 
so doing it is not proper to consider a word or 
phrase disconnected from other parts of the 
act and recognizing that words and phrases must 
be given their ordinary meaning, uless it is neces-
sary to give to particular words or phrases a 
restricted or an enlarged meaning so as to har-
monize all the provisions of the statute and make 
them effective ... " (Italics added) 
And in State v. Franklin et al, 63 Ut. 442, 226 P. 
674, at Page 447 of the Utah report, the Court said: 
''It is also an elementary rule of statutory con-
struction that the meaning of words found in 
the statute must be determined from the general 
context of the same and the intent or object sought 
to be accomplished by the legislation; that court 
in attempting to arrive at the intent of the legis-
lature will disregard mere form and look to the 
substance.'' 
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'rhe Court's op1n10n holds that town and city at-
torneys cannot file cases for violation of the Liquor 
Control Act and pursue them independently of county 
and district attorneys. The reasons given for such 
holding are very strong and compelling. As the opinion 
says, a second system of law enforcement would not be 
a good thing and would only lead to confusion and over-
lapping of functions. We must assume that all the 
arguments against a second and overlapping system 
were known to the legislature at the time Section 46-0-
219 was enacted and the legislature did not want and 
so did not provide for town and city attorneys to act 
independently of county and district attorneys in liquor 
cases. It is also reasonable to assume that at the time 
of the enactment of Section 46-0-219, there was no 
reason to suppose that sometime in the future conditions 
would change so that another legislature would set up 
a dual system for enforcing the Liquor Control Act. 
The reasons for not providing for the dual system in 
the first place are not mere transitory reasons, but are 
compelling and basic. It follows, then, that the Court's 
conclusion in the second to last paragraph of its opinion 
as to what the legislature intended cannot he correct. 
If the legislature intended to remit fines and forfeitures 
to cities and towns only when attorneys of such munici-
palities conducted on behalf of the State proceedings 
against the accused, the legislature intended something 
that could never be. This is ridiculous. Under the 
Court's interpretation of the act, the legislature involved 
did not provide for cities and towns to ever receive fines 
and forfeitures back, and that legislature had every 
reason to know that no subsequent legislature would 
set up the dual system of enforcement. Thus, at no 
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time could cities and towns recover any of the fines 
and forfeitures. It is inconceivable that the legislature 
would say fines and forfeitures would be returned to 
towns and cities on certain conditions, knowing the con-
ditions imposed could never be filled and therefore 
tmYns and cities could never receive any of the fines 
and forfeitures. 
The intention of the legislature in enacting Sec-
tion 46-0-219, as found by all members of this Court 
in this case, was to provide for a return to towns and 
cities in some cases of the fines and forfeitures for-
warded to the state treasurer. The Court's opinion 
says that the cases when remittances are to be made 
are only those when the attorneys for the town or city 
prosecute and conduct the trials and hearings, and since 
the attorneys cannot do that, towns and cities cannot 
get any of the fines or forfeitures back. This ruling 
defeats the obvious and overarching purpose of return-
ing some of the fines and forfeitures and, as clearly 
shown by the cases herein cited, such an interpretation 
is to be avoided if there is another reasonable interpre-
tation which will give effect to the legislative purpose. 
The Court's opinion which results in holding the 
legislature did a useless act and defeats its overarching 
purposes results from the restricted meaning given the 
words ''prosecute'' and ''conduct'' in Section 46-0-219. 
The opinion insists the usual meaning be attributed to 
those two words, but in the same paragraph, the Court 
interprets the word ''officer'' in the statute to mean not 
what is usually meant by that word, but the very special 
and unusual meaning of "town or city attorney". 
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In addition to the reasons given by ~Ir. Justice 
Wade in his dissenting opinion, we submit that "offi-
cer", "prosecute" and "conduct" cannot all be given 
their usual meaning in this statute and have it make 
sense. One or more of those words was definitely used 
by the legislature not in its usual and ordinary mean-
ing. The Court's opinion chooses to hold that "proce-
cute" and "conduct" were the words the legislature 
intended to have their usual meaning and ''officers'' 
was used by the legislature not to mean "officers", but 
to mean "town or city attorney". This decision makes 
the statute a nullity and defeats what is the obvious 
overall legislative intent to return some fines and for-
feitures to the cities and towns. On the other hand, 
if the Court would give the word "officer" its usual 
meaning and give ''prosecute'' and ''conduct'' the 
broader meaning than is usually given, the Court would 
give effect to the overall intent of the legislature, as 
found by the Court, that some fines and forfeitures be 
returned, and would avoid the conclusion that the legis-
lature did a useless act when it enacted the latter por-
tions of Section 46-0-219. 
In this case, when in any event one or more words 
will have to be given a different meaning than is usually 
given, and one interpretation results in a useless and 
nugatory statute and the other interpretation results in 
an effective and meaningful statute, the Court should 
take the interpretation which results in a live statute 
rather than the one which results in a useless and dead 
statute. To do otherwise clearly would violate the ex-
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pn·~~ n1andate of the legislature that ~tatutory pro-
Yisions • • are to be liberally construed with a view to 
effect the objects of the statutes ... " (Emphasis added.) 
Section 8:2-:2-:2, U .C.A. 19-!3. 
The Court's opinion is contrary to and in effect 
overrules this statute and the Court's previous de-
cisions in which it has held that if possible, statutes 
should be interpreted so that they are effective rather 
than nugatory. 
It is respectfully urged that a rehearing be granted 
in this matter, and that the interpretation of the statute 
herein involved be again considered by the Court, and 
upon said reconsideration, the plaintiff be granted the 
relief prayed for in its complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL THATCHER, 
CHHARLES H. SNEDDON, 
JACK A. RICHARDS, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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